Silence. On the track only the engines of Ryanair's Boing 737 roaring towards Valencia. The waters of the Pond of Santa Gilla rest restlessly on the eastern border of the international airport of Cagliari. The fence is as imposing as that concertina of barbed wire tangled on the slopes of cameras and sensors. Here, on the day of the disclosure by our newspaper of the explosive Security Report on the Cagliari airport, the desert reigns. It is Sunday in via dei Trasvolatori, the operational headquarters of Sogaer.

Heavy papers

Public holiday, despite the publication of the devastating content of the exclusive documents of the Central Inspection Nucleus of ENAC, the National Civil Aviation Authority, delegated by the President of the Council of Ministers for the security of the main airport of the island. Heavy papers such as the accusations made against the security system managed directly by the top management of the management company and its associate, which operates under a housing regime, or rather performs the service without delegation to external companies. That report that we have come into possession of puts the direct responsibility of the top management against the wall who, for months and months, have known well that technological equipment fundamental for safety was totally out of order. For six months, those imposing fencing networks, a good 4 and a half kilometers, had been devoid of any intrusion alarm and no cameras on several fronts were working. A very serious security vulnerability, for which nothing was done until the men of the Central Inspection Nucleus burst onto the track with the delegation not to look anyone in the face. After all, the safety of an airport cannot be delegated to lightness or personal sympathy.

A six-month gap

Six months that weigh like a boulder on the management of Sogaer, the company leader in the management of safety equipment, starting with tenders and maintenance. Certainly very few were aware of that secret report that Sogaer's top management tried in every possible way to lock up, even fearing the existence of "classified" news and therefore to be classified. They had good reason to keep everything secret. An eloquent silence functional to prevent even a single draft from leaking out on those four days in which the ENAC inspectors had turned the airport upside down, from the runway to the entire passenger and baggage access chain. A blitz that had transformed the airport into a sieve, precisely due to the lack of maintenance and efficiency of the technological equipment available to security. The staff, trained over decades and with great experience in the field, lacked the technological support that could only be guaranteed with timely investments and a serious maintenance plan.

The Bologna case

A case similar to that of Cagliari occurred some time ago in Bologna. On that occasion, the ENAC inspectors had managed to evade the controls only three times with as many improvised explosive devices "IED", Improvised Explosive Device. In that case, the Deputy Prosecutor of Bologna Valter Giovannini had opened an information file, without suspects or crime titles.

The Cagliari case

Meanwhile, the load of accusations against Cagliari is increasing hour after hour. If yesterday we disclosed the report relating to the transit of passengers, today we publish the one relating to all the other figures that rotate inside the airport. The chapter of the dossier is codified: «1.3 - Control of persons other than passengers and of the objects they carry». The test performed is with a "prohibited" article. At 9.35 am on 4 August 2021, two anonymous inspectors show up at the departure staff gate. One with an IED, an IED, and another with a 10-centimeter Opinel switchblade. In both cases the outcome is negative. The technical safety apparatuses do not identify either of the two prohibited objects.

Fbi of Enac

At 10.05 am on the same day the FBI men from Enac show up at the arrivals staff gate: in this too an improvised device and the same type of knife. Again none of these are intercepted by security machinery. Always at the Arrivals Staff they try again at 10.45. Another improvised explosive device. For the umpteenth time they manage to pass without any relief. The overall picture is devastating. 27 attempts to introduce explosive devices and prohibited weapons were carried out among all the passenger and staff gates under examination. Only six times have these been identified. For the rest, the dramatic abacus of potential risks ran up to 21. 21 times in three days the airport security gates were violated with improvised explosive devices. All this until now had remained in absolute silence. As if it were not necessary to make known what was really happening in the main transport infrastructure of the island and how, if anything, it was intended to remedy. The blitz inspection of the ENAC security apparatuses has opened an unprecedented highly relevant front in the management of the airport and it is not excluded that that dossier is already available to other authorities.

The flaws in the system

The papers in our possession are a string of black holes in security management that put the entire airport governance under fire. Just for the record, some of the further points raised by the Central Inspection Unit are reported. The most serious is the one concerning the Rx apparatus of the departures staff. The finding is without appeal: non-compliant. Inspectors allocate a maximum of 5 days to restore the x-ray instruments. From inside to outside: "in many areas along the perimeter - the inspectors write - there is thick vegetation with the presence of shrubs, reeds and trees" which prevent the full view of the runway and its control to avoid illegal interference. The same relief with even worse conditions is moved between gate 10 and 11, between 12 and 13, between 17 and 18.

Serious shortcomings

All abandoned with "serious shortcomings", writes the report, for the control of the track and the entire perimeter. There is also more on a formal and consequently substantial level. In chapter 1.5 dedicated to the checks of "Surveillance, patrolling and other physical checks" the position of the Central Nucleus is without appeal: "The surveillance procedure is not approved by ENAC". A devastating picture that brings out the very serious dangers in terms of safety not only on the ground but also and above all in flight, considering the risk that real explosive devices could really take off from Cagliari airport. Now, it is evident, we expect to understand from the responsible parties whether all the necessary measures have been taken to remedy the collapse recorded by the undercover agents of the ENAC inspection service. Everything, however, is evident, it cannot end in tarallucci and wine.

Previous reports

In the security dossier, in fact, there are repeated reports both from the State Police, stationed at the airport, and from the ENAC regional directorate itself. Punctual reports requesting the replacement of cameras and guaranteeing full control of the airport perimeter. To remedy, and give notice of it, also means identifying the responsibilities for what happened, without unloading them on the weak links in the chain. The leaders could not have been unaware of this situation and it is evident that they will have to assume the necessary consequences, even before the bodies that expressed them. In this whole affair there is a fundamental vulnerability: the management of one of the nerve centers of an airport, that of security. You cannot pretend that nothing has happened.

Military Airport

Finally, in the report, there is a not secondary chapter: the military airport passed into the hands of Sogaer with procedures to be verified. In practice, the surveys of the Central Nucleus show that between the structure on the opposite side of the terminal there is a real "mixture" of security. The east front, that of the former military airport, passed under the aegis of Sogaer in exchange for money and work, is still without a safety specification and the inspectors point this out very clearly: "for access from the area military in the critical area does not appear to be an alert system in case of non-compliance with the same ". According to inspectors, that former military front does not provide the necessary security guarantees.

Citadel of the air

A chapter that of the Citadel of the air, the first historical nucleus of Cagliari airport, which reserves new revelations on secret passages and hidden agreements of state assets and assets in total violation of the statutory provisions, also of Constitutional rank. Now, even in that enclave of military flight, time has stopped, between oblivion and neglect.

(5. continue)

Mauro Pili

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