The lack of a pandemic plan, the difficulties in finding masks and protective devices already known eight days before the "patient 0", an alarm on the progression of the infection and the catastrophic consequences underestimated or ignored due to the "political, economic and social" of the red zone.

All written in black and white in the advice of Professor Andrea Crisanti which the Bergamo prosecutor made use of, which closed the investigation into the first wave of Covid that brought Val Seriana to its knees.

In the register of suspects there are 19 people, among them the former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, the former Minister of Health Roberto Speranza, the president of the Lombardy Region Attilio Fontana, his former councilor for Welfare Giulio Gallera, the president of the Higher Institute of Health, Silvio Brusaferro, the coordinator of the first Scientific Technical Committee Agostino Miozzo, the then head of the Civil Protection Angelo Borrelli and the president of the Higher Health Council, Franco Locatelli.

COUNT, HOPE, FOUNTAIN AND CTS KNEW

On 27 and 28 February 2020, the report reads, "the CTS and Minister Speranza have all the information on the progression of the infection which showed how the scenario on the ground was far worse than the one considered catastrophic". And information on the seriousness of the situation in Alzano and Nembro was the subject of a meeting of the CTS on March 2 "not officially recorded in the presence of Minister Speranza and President Conte". Speranza and Conte, on the other hand, tell the Bergamo prosecutor's office "that they learned of the case of Alzano and Nembro respectively" on 4 and 5 March.

Indeed, the microbiologist continues, precisely "on the basis of the forecasts of the scenario with Rt equal to 2, the Cts and Speranza agreed to secrete the Covid Plan, developed by the epidemiologist Stefano Merler, so as not to alarm public opinion".

The red zone in Val Seriana on 27 February 2020 ("the date on which the Cts and the Lombardy Region were aware of the seriousness of the situation") and 3 March 2020 "would have made it possible to avoid, with a 95% probability, 4,148 and 2,659 deaths respectively ».

COVID TO RISE ALREADY ON FEBRUARY 4TH

At the Alzano Lombardo hospital, Covid had already been circulating since February 4, 2020, more than two weeks before the date of the case of Patient 1, with three infected patients hospitalized in the medical ward on the third floor and one in the ward on the second floor "with a clinical picture compatible with Sars-Cov2 infection then confirmed with a molecular swab ».

FEW TESTS

On 24 February 2020, the report reads, "the CTS highlighted that in the absence of symptoms, the test was unjustified, speaking of the risk of an overestimation of the phenomenon in the country".

An indication that, writes Crisanti, "will instead have serious consequences for understanding what was really happening, because the count of asymptomatic cases would have given crucial information on the extent of the spread of Covid".

VULNERABLE COUNTRY

Another chapter, a vulnerable country which already on February 12, eight days before Patient 1, knew it was: the ministry's task force and the Cts were "aware of the difficulty of finding PPE and materials for their production" and therefore knew "the situation of vulnerability in which Italy found itself and the risk to which the population and health workers would have been exposed by not taking suitable initiatives".

To make up for the shortage of surgical masks and Ffp2, in the days following 23 February 2020, the health workers of the Alzano Lombardo hospital were advised and given the authorization "to use the masks of the fire kits present in the wards" .

Furthermore, the chats show that the staff "have been instructed to reuse" the Ffp2, "a procedure contrary to every principle of safety and prevention".

«For 16 years», from 2004 to 2020, «there has never been a single activity or project undertaken that had the objective of assessing the state of implementation of the National Pandemic Plan and/or of verifying Italy's state of preparedness in the against the pandemic risk », continues Crisanti.

THE SECRET PLAN AND THE COSTS OF THE RED ZONE

Speranza, Brusaferro, Miozzo, Dr. D'Amario "were aware of the Covid plan, the forecast scenarios and the seriousness of the situation", but "they made the decision to keep the plan secret so as not to alarm public opinion". And "the top management of the Lombardy Region" were also aware of all this.

«The reason why more timely and more restrictive actions have not been taken - Crisanti writes again - is provided by President Conte when in the meeting of 2 March 2020 he affirms that 'the red zone must be used sparingly because it has a social, political cost. and very high cost. These considerations prevailed over the need to protect operators in the national health system and citizens from the spread of the infection".

Furthermore, Speranza, in the first days of March 2020, sent a message to Brusaferro: «Conte does not close the two municipalities without a structured relationship. Think that if there isn't a difference with other municipalities it has an enormous cost without benefit».

PANDEMIC PLAN

There was a pandemic plan, even if old and to be adapted, but "it was rejected a priori without being evaluated by the main technical bodies of the ministry". Italy thus "faced the pandemic without an instruction manual".

In supporting this, Crisanti refers to the spontaneous declarations made by Claudio D'Amario, former director general of the ministry's health prevention and now under investigation. Words that "shed light on the decision-making process that led to ignoring the National Pandemic Plan".

According to the report "it was the only operational document available which, although not perfectly aligned with the most recent WHO indications, contained a series of well-detailed actions to counter the spread" of the virus.

It was Silvio Brusaferro, Crisanti reconstructs, who proposed an "alternative solution" to the pandemic plan. And the microbiologist hypothesizes that this choice was made after "a careful technical-scientific evaluation". But Brusaferro himself, when he was heard as a witness by the Bergamo prosecutors, reported that he had read the 2006 pandemic plan for the first time in May 2020.

(Unioneonline/L)

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