The military cable is hidden in a ravine of the Port Authority of Arbatax. Away from prying eyes, silenced by higher orders. Nobody should know what happens in that stretch of sea off the eastern coast of Sardinia, the one where the "ups and downs" of passenger ships, cargo freight and oil tankers pass every day. Only the "drafts" on board allow you to intercept the message of the Command of the Experimental Polygon and Joint Forces Training of "Salto di Quirra".

Secret dispatch

The "secret" dispatch is directed to the top management of the maritime district office responsible for the area. The content for the state offices is synthetic as few. There are not too many news and explanations to be provided externally, let alone if the content of the phonogram must announce that, during the war games off the polygon, the "joint forces" ships, destroyers and aircraft carriers, "dispersed" two war missiles ended up submerged in those waters without ever exploding. It was last October 24th when sheet 15479 broke into the desk of Mattia Caniglia, the thirty-four-year-old commander of the Circomare di Arbatax who had just landed in Sardinia from Mazara del Vallo where he led the technical, security and port defense section.

Explosive alarm

He couldn't help but read that letter from the high seas just delivered from the upper floors of Quirra. He had to carefully evaluate it, understand how to move, since the news concerned a real explosive alarm in the stretch of sea where boats, ships of all kinds, fishermen and so on pass every day. On the other hand, he knew very well that the news had to be treated with confidentiality since the military leaders had not reached out to divulge the news. 48 hours pass and the new commander breaks the delay. He cannot keep track of that news for long: at 11 and 17 on Wednesday 26 October his digital signature authorizes the publication of the alarm in the less frequented area of the Harbor Office, that of the notices.

Notice of danger

No ordinance, too visible, even though the Command of the Salto di Quirra had explicitly requested that provision, peremptory and ordering. The Harbor Master's Office does not respond to the request for an ordinance and opts for a "Notice of Danger". It is number two of the current year. By chance, therefore, it turns out that 18 days earlier, on October 8, the same captaincy had been forced to issue the first danger notice of the year. In that case, four days had passed from the Polygon's alarm to the publication of the official note, meaning that the procedure for disclosing the news "secretly" had been carefully examined. The leak was leaked by the second announcement of danger in order of time.

War setup

From the first days of October that stretch of sea was plagued by dozens of warships, armed to the teeth, in combat gear since the provisions disclosed in those days by the Sardinian Union spoke without preamble of a "warfighting" orientation ", That is, explicitly intended for emergency intervention in a war conflict linked" to the evolution of the international chessboard ". The reality is that they weren't playing "blind fly", but they were firing missiles, bombs and the most devastating that can be in a war setup. Not fake missiles, but those that cost a bang of money, millions of euros of armaments to "consume" in Sardinian land and sea, just to replenish the arsenals and fill the wallets of the military industries. Exercises, however, not gratifying given the communication that the leaders of the Defense had to disclose, albeit briefly, bringing out the flop of missile launches with the consequent extremely high danger in those stretches of sea. The announcement of danger n.2 is explicit: "The Command of the Experimental Polygon and Joint Training of" Salto di Quirra "has requested the issuance of the Ordinance for the presence of two residues having a length of 3 meters and a diameter of about 127 mm, lying on the seabed respectively 21 and 23 miles from the coast ».

Human life

The consequences are all in confidential communication: it is "necessary to guarantee public safety, the safety of navigation and the protection of human life at sea, maritime traffic and any other activity of use of the sea in the stretch of sea in question". Safeguarding of human life, maritime traffic: not random definitions, given that all the navigation algorithms trace very high frequencies in that stretch of sea. What is most surprising is the use of the words, which are contradictory in substance: in the same note it is argued, in fact, that the two missiles are first "lying in the seabed" and then, immediately after "two remnants of the military exercises of the Joint Forces of the Leap of Quirra ».

Missiles missing

The last of the two notices warns that: «the sea areas with a radius of 300 meters from the points indicated are dangerous for navigation, fishing and similar professions, as well as for any other underwater activity». They are declared "missing", in reality, however, in the same note the military leaders disclose the coordinates of the areas at sea in which those missiles, probably launched by the military ships deployed for weeks in that sea area, would have settled, without to blow up. One fact is irrefutable, those residues did not explode, because otherwise they would certainly be polluting, but they would not be dangerous for human life.

Military secrecy

Real missiles, of declared dimensions but not attributed, for obvious reasons of military secrecy, to a specific military force. The methods of communication, however, suggest that this "warning of danger" is an unprecedented fact in the chessboard of military exercises, given that until now most of these situations have been hidden and silenced by the defense leaders themselves. The start of this procedure would therefore date back to last October 8, when, in the same perimeter of the sea, the first missile launched but not exploded following the exercises in progress on the vast eastern coast of Sardinia was declared "missing". Again, same size as the last two missiles reported missing. In all three cases, types and explosive charges, range potential and destructive capacity are never mentioned. The suspects are different, obviously linked to the type of ship that used them and to the national flag of the "destroyers" on a mission in that area. Ballistics experts certainly speak of a light torpedo missile, used on a ship or aircraft, including helicopters. One could hypothesize the names of the weapon adopted, but the attribution of the failure of the missile launch requires official communications, which for the moment are not there, given the silence chosen so far by the armed forces.

Anti-submarine missiles

At stake are missiles in ASW code, Anti-Submarine Warfare, or torpedoes capable of intercepting, following and hitting submarines and surface ships. Those type of armament are usually used by "frigates" but also antisubmarine aircraft carriers, maritime patrol aircraft, antisubmarine helicopters, or other attack submarines. All "ingredients" of war present in those simulated conflict scenarios on the Sardinian coasts.

Explosions at a high price

A consumption, in this case unsuccessful, of high-cost armaments destined to devastate the seabed characterized by a balance that deserves much more treatment. Today we can tell about these three failed launches, complete with permanent danger in that stretch of sea, but we do not know how many other missiles, bombs or torpedoes have wreaked havoc on the sea around the island. An avalanche of money to devastate the sea with exercises as useless as they are functional to the waste of financial resources destined in fact to subsidize the greed of the war industry.

Three billion for missiles

It would be enough to read what is written in the very confidential arms purchase plan of the Ministry of Defense for this kind of missiles in 2022: "The Navy will obtain for the two Orizzonte class units (Doria and Duilio), (those that were in action in the seas of Sardinia in those days), Aster 15 and Aster 30, the result of the update of the existing missiles and Aster 30 B1-NT of new production, for the 8 + 2 Frem class units Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles and, finally, by ship Cavour missiles Aster 15 ». The cost of the program is estimated at over 3 billion euros, an avalanche of money to be given to the military industries in exchange for missiles destined to devastate the Sardinian coasts forever or to sink, perpetually explosive, into the seas of the island. In the face of the economic and energy crisis, the stellar bills, poverty and missiles that settle without exploding in the seas of Sardinia. Without thinking of those who are blown up with impunity near the Sardinian coast, devastating it without delay and respect.

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