In the spring of 1938, Hitler had been in power in Germany for five years. He had rearmed his country and had just annexed Austria to the Third Reich. He had also united in his hands the positions of Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the German armed forces. In order to achieve the formation of the great Reich, Hitler believed it necessary to conquer Czechoslovakia, both because of the strong numerical presence of Germans on its territory (the community was about 3 million individuals), and because of its strategic position in the center of Europe. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia had flourishing industries, a powerful military armament and raw materials in quantity. Under precise instructions from Hitler, the Nazis of the German-majority area of the Sudetenland, a region on the border between Czechoslovakia and Germany, requested complete administrative autonomy. The Czech government was not willing to accept these requests and the Fuhrer exploited the situation to affirm that the Germans of Czechoslovakia were oppressed, discriminated against. They demanded his intervention. The Czech government then asked for the support of Great Britain and France, who at first reluctantly chose to side with the Czechs.
However, it was clear to everyone that the situation could only be resolved with an agreement between the great powers or by taking up arms. Mussolini, under British pressure from the English, offered himself as a mediator, suggesting a conference on the issue between France, England, Germany and Italy. On 29 September the Munich Conference opened, a crucial moment in twentieth-century European history to which the essay Scacco alla pace (Neri Pozza, 2024, Euro 25.00, pp.496. Also Ebook) is dedicated, written by the historian and dean of Italian diplomacy, Maurizio Serra.
An essay that is as timely as ever, even though it is dedicated to events that are more than eighty years old, given that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the Munich Conference back to the forefront, even if the story and interpretation follow the wave of emotion and forget the real historical context. Maurizio Serra, at the end of a long investigation in archives throughout Europe, gives us the authentic story of the event that changed the world, clarifying, in the light of new documents, the role of Mussolini, who at that time had not yet aligned himself with the positions of the Third Reich. Aware of the weaknesses of his army and how Nazi ambitions did not correspond to Italian interests, the Duce wanted to avoid conflict and test the reactions of democracies, in view of possible future agreements. It is interesting to note in the book how Roosevelt and Stalin, absent from the conference, moved: Munich was also preparing the abandonment of the isolation chosen by the United States after the First World War and the future German-Soviet pact for the partition of Poland. Furthermore, Serra sketches, with his characteristic mastery, the portraits of the four main actors of the Conference, namely Hitler, Mussolini, the English Prime Minister Chamberlain, the head of the French government Daladier and also outlines the figures of the protagonists behind the scenes in a story full of anecdotes and revelations.
How it ended can be a warning to us when we think that wanting peace is enough to actually obtain it. In Munich, it was decided to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, in exchange for assurances from Hitler – rather vague in truth – not to provoke further international incidents that could lead to war. Mussolini and Chamberlain were praised as the architects of a finally lasting peace and bilateral non-aggression agreements were signed between the powers. Hitler, however, had no intention of giving up his plans and a month after Munich he already had plans ready for an attack on Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, using the conflicts between the Czechs and the Slovaks as a pretext and setting himself up as the champion of Slovakia, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia without a fight, created the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under his direct control and transformed Slovakia into a puppet state, effectively dominated by the Reich. Also in March 1939, Hitler forced Lithuania to cede the city of Memel and signed an economic treaty with Romania that gave the Germans access to oil fields, a fundamental condition for waging an imminent war. Munich thus became the symbol of Hitler's arrogance, marked the end of Mussolini's international autonomy and the conference was pointed out as a disgrace for Great Britain and France who, out of fear of war, had chosen to betray Czechoslovakia. As Winston Churchill said in those days: "They have chosen dishonor to avoid war, they will have dishonor and war."
