Generally, even if it is not said one hundred percent that the very general and unusual regulation of the so-called "exceptions" is seen and considered in this way, with a good approximation, when a Government, and moreover still in its neonatal state such as that of Giorgia Meloni (and which, therefore, should express itself in all its reformist originality), begins to want to put its hand on the constitutional reform, then, almost certainly, that same embryonic government would seem to express, in spite of itself, all its intrinsic and extrinsic weakness. Let's be clear: the circumstance, in the eyes of most, may perhaps appear almost like a paradox as underlined by many, both for reasons of a technically numerical nature expressed by the parliamentary majority, and for reasons of a relational nature, given the connection, when forced, when of pure and simple managerial opportunity, subsumed within a government plan that is probably still lacking in essential contents to be reflected externally.

However, and these first eight months of government seem to have ascertained it with symptomatic evidence, and in reality, Giorgia Meloni's right-wing government is characterized by having a very modest popular legitimacy, clearly revealed, conversely, and to tell the truth, by a certain "numerical imperfection" due to the participation in the vote of 25 September last of only a minimal fringe of Italian citizens who, with good likelihood, and with hindsight, would seem to have wanted to cast a so-called "reaction vote" with an almost punitive compared to the traditional political forces of which the executive had been composed up to that moment.

If we then wanted to reflect even just for a moment on the devastating effects that, in the absence of any appropriate corrective action, the reduction in the numbers of parliamentary representation has produced (and Sardinia has been overwhelmed in full view and considering that it will lose its own representative), then it would not even be surprising, at least in terms of the prejudice closely connected to the insufficiency of the quorum needed to proceed with the Reform.

In short, on balance, now as then, i.e. at the time of the Renzi-Boschi Reform, it is only, and mainly, the numbers that betray. In the latter case, and remembering it does no harm, the reform proposal, hard fought by the then parliamentary opposition and not only, had met with a pale approval expressed with the votes of a majority of less than two thirds of the members of each chamber, and consequently, as prescribed by article 138 of the Constitution, the coveted provision could not be promulgated directly but, rather, be subjected to a popular referendum whose results, for better or for worse, are extremely well known to all and have marked the political ascent of its proponents is indelible.

But if then the project was at least clear (but not too much) on the contents of that reform, made explicit, it must be recognized, in a clear and reasoned manner, today it would not seem to have proceeded in the same way, with all consequences in terms of not only the extemporary nature of the project in the reformist announcements, but also of its concreteness and ideological seriousness, given and considering that a program cannot be considered valid which, moving from the notion of "presidentialism" then intends to degrade to that of "premiership" without going through the slightest typological clarification. It being understood that the clarifications, even considering everything, cannot in any way be reduced to the status of "optional".

Italy would seem to need everything, except men and/or women alone in command if, as it should be, the institutional apparatus characteristic of our Constitution is of a parliamentary nature. But the point of each reasoning is one and priority over any other: what purpose can ever want to achieve those who intend to strengthen, through the popular choice, or hypothetically such, the legitimacy of the prime minister? Why urge a change in the relationship and autonomy in the relations between government and parliament? If, as announced by Giorgia Meloni herself, the reason for everything would like to lie in offering citizens only the opportunity to directly express a preference, then, the motivation would reveal all its uselessness, fallacy, and harmfulness on a practical level, given that, once that preference has been expressed, the prime minister would probably remain, in the absence of any operational constraint, absolutely free to operate at his discretion, putting any guarantee of stability at serious risk.

In short, according to what the experience of the last decade seems to want to teach, whoever suffers from proclamations perishes. And even this experience of right-wing government appears very disappointing even in terms of expressive clarity which should never be lacking. Above all when, as in the present case, one has the audacity to want to proceed with the transformation (very improbable given the premises) of the relationship between the electorate and the government. One can even say it, mind you, but then it is necessary to be consequential, and it must be so in a clear and resolute manner.

What additional powers would Giorgia Meloni intend to have in the exercise of her mandate? What goals does it intend to pursue that, to date, would be precluded? The Italian Constitution has unique prerogatives in their consistency, all harmoniously connected in their original structure. So why take the risk of weakening its reach? Wouldn't it perhaps be more appropriate to strengthen Parliament and democratic confrontation within the institutions? This should be the main point of the comparison.

We cannot run the risk of depriving democratic bodies of content in the name of we don't know (at present) exactly what. Even more, when every attempt at constitutional reform would seem to have had a negative impact on the political path of its promoters.

The needs of the country are quite different, and concern the handling of everyday life and its essential needs, and the Government should concentrate its intervention force on these aspects. Either you are able to do it, or you give the Italians a voice back through the polls.

Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro

***

© Riproduzione riservata