I always feel a certain discomfort when I find myself facing, on different levels of investigation, the issues inherent to the so-called "end of life": if only for the intimacy that accompanies the decision-making and motivational sphere of human intervention on a biological event a priori subtracted, when for religious conviction, when for mere accidentality, from the individual determination of each of us. Yet the question has arisen, and still arises, with the prevailing force of its solving duty: "to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, to God what belongs to God", one would be induced to exclaim, but not always the border is clear and / or universally acceptable.

If, then, Montecitorio, according to what has been learned from the most accredited press, has welcomed with good propensity the start of the works, however, the debate on the provision, previously mutilated through the introduction, in the Commission, of the "objection of conscience ”, failed to achieve any result due to the apparently occasional desertion of members of Parliament. I am not surprised: facing today, in full deterministic paralysis, such a delicate issue, would have entailed the subtraction of time to define the "unfortunate" reforms (considered in their outcomes) implemented by the Government of the Best (rectius: dei " Methuselah ") at the behest of the European Union. I would add, however, that the absence, however understood, is also a signal: of convenience, of opportunity, of small and superficial moralism. It is certainly not easy to indicate useful solutions to curb the decline of a Parliament since such solutions, unfortunately, should come from the same political forces that caused it. It is always the same story of the dog biting its tail: the less the dynamism is questioned the more it becomes gangrenous and stops working. A signal, however, of a markedly progressive nature, had to be given even just to ensure the survival of the original system of a party, the Democratic one, which strangely found itself floating, almost inert, on external political dynamics decided on different levels. intervention. But not deciding is always better, probably, than also deciding to make a mistake, albeit in the pursuit of a valuable understanding. Those who do not do not make mistakes: they say. And in the meantime the great social questions of our time remain unresolved, thus, in the general indifference.

Well: even if we want to neglect the political profile of the legislative intervention in question, in fact, according to the precise indications of the Constitutional Court, few and haphazard conditions would be sufficient to access the "service" of "assisted suicide": in the meantime, that the subject interested, is able to understand and want; therefore, that he is suffering from an irreversible pathology; then, who suffers severe physical or mental suffering; and finally, that its survival is directly attributable to the presence of vital aids. And although it appears rather agile to predict the conditions, nevertheless, their preventive examination does not seem to be able to be useful in the potential decision on the admissibility of the intervention. But, upstream, it is still a question of dealing with the unavoidable need to fill, if indeed this is the case, a regulatory vacuum that so far would have prevented our country from aligning itself with many others who are more prudent on the specific problem.

But let's think about it: is it really necessary to draw up an ad hoc law on the specific profile, or else the existing regulatory framework, through the systematic elaboration of Article 32 of the Constitution, considered in its extensive moment, is suitable, in itself , to define the question of "when" to die? Why not complete and authoritative application of the sacrosanct individual “right of self-determination” guaranteed not only by the aforementioned article 32, second paragraph, but also by the common principles of medical ethics? Why complicate the regulatory framework with the elaboration of an ultra-compliant legislation which, in its application moment, would clash with the constitutional norm of reference? If we want to regulate each specific sector of the existing one in detail, do we not run the risk of infinitely dissecting the unfolding of basic concepts already appropriately defined on a general level in order to be addressed to the generality of the associates?

Let's be clear, just to go back to the proverbial initial assumption on the division of competences between "Caesar" and "God": freedom of choice must always prevail ("free will"), both for the patient recipient of any intervention, and for the health worker called to perform it. The "Englaro" case is a pilot in the specific matter: "it must be excluded" - observed the Supreme Court on the occasion - "that the patient's right to therapeutic self-determination" may encounter "a limit when it results in the sacrifice of the good of life". So, is it really necessary to add more by complicating an already fully articulated regulatory system? I doubt it, albeit cautiously. Certain principles appear in fact in all their incontrovertible since there is a right to die already consecrated by the Court of Strasbourg which, with all due respect to the belated Italian interpreter, has already stated for some time the existence of the right to decide the "how" and the " when "of the lethal event:" not living bonum est, sed bene viv ". Do we really need to add more?

Giuseppina Di Salvatore

(Lawyer - Nuoro)

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