Strait of Hormuz: the US-Iran standoff continues. Following the joint attack by the United States and Israel, although the specific purpose of the operation remains unclear, Tehran, going beyond any possible international pressure (and/or prediction), responded harshly by using the Strait itself as a strategic lever of power, effectively impeding maritime traffic. And ultimately, by doing so, it appears to have somehow duplicated, mutatis mutandis, and emulated Trump's trade war strategy.

Given the effects on consumer costs, one might cynically exclaim, unfortunately (given the resulting radial effects), paraphrasing an old adage and adapting it to the needs of the situation, that those who hurt the economy, perish and/or could perish. It was certainly no secret to anyone that the Strait of Hormuz has always been one of the most interesting energy bottlenecks on the planet, a true epicenter of global geopolitical friction. It was no secret to anyone that a potential, and dramatically real, crisis involving the Strait would affect, as it did, the global economy. How, then, could the United States and Israel have acted "alone," underestimating such a crucial aspect and exposing the global economic balance to risk? How could they have failed to consider, among other things, that Europe, a historic American ally, would face significant difficulties caused by rising crude oil and fuel prices? How could it still have been overlooked that such a warlike act would have alerted the Gulf monarchies, notoriously oil-exporting? This is all the more true when one considers that neither the United States nor Iran appear to have signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982 in Montego Bay, whose provisions, however, appear to be recognized (or at least should be) under customary law. And even more so when, and consequently, precisely on the basis of that Convention, by virtue of Article 56 thereof, coastal states can claim, so to speak, sovereign rights over the resources of their exclusive economic zone. Conversely, by virtue of Article 58 thereof, freedom of navigation should be guaranteed, both under customary law, in the area in question, especially where, under Article 38 of the aforementioned Convention, as well as under customary law, the so-called principle of "transit passage" must be guaranteed.

In the situation that has arisen, Iran appears to have sought to respond by influencing the dynamics of "influence" and control, creating considerable unease, so to speak, in the economic and other power relations between the various international players involved. To put it differently, though it may seem unnecessary, the closure/blockade of the Strait of Hormuz represents a highly tense geopolitical response, if only because it evokes, in its intensity and impact, the blockade of the Suez Canal way back in 1956. The consequences can only be systemic, considering that Washington, while consistently taking a highly aggressive stance through Donald Trump, finds itself in a highly delicate position, having to guarantee the security of Israel as its historic ally, and at the same time having taken direct action precisely where strategy and its own convenience should have dictated caution and impartiality in the entire operation.

Moscow, which in any case appears to have no intention of intervening, paradoxically appears to be the only power to derive immediate economic benefit from the current situation. The time for multilateralism seems to be over. At the purely national level, the situation appears to be constantly evolving, highlighting the urgent need for an effective alternative that can reconcile the defense of national economic interests with international stability, especially through the pursuit of new alliances and a genuine European unity.

Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro

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