Unipolarity versus bipolarism: the roots of NATO enlargement
The current situation will end up making the forming (if indeed so) world order particularly uncertain and shakyPer restare aggiornato entra nel nostro canale Whatsapp
In recent days, Finland and Sweden , that is countries marked by a long and convinced tradition of neutrality, have proceeded to formalize their request for membership of NATO, receiving the generalized, or almost universal, applause of the European Union. Whether it is a coincidence, whether it is a direct reductive consequence, and in some way banal, of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, or the pure and simple translation in fact of a decision that has basically been meditated over time but has never been revealed so far, it will be history to tell it.
Certainly, such requests for membership are the testimony, more or less disruptive, and probably very inconvenient on a strategic level, of a radical change in the geopolitical vision of the power relations between the two maxi blocs of concentration of power. But, in reality, in the current war context "Who wants What?"
Are we all unaware victims of a large-scale revisionist project finalistically aimed at delegitimizing the defensive system that has arisen, albeit in an uncertain and obsolete way, with the passing of the years and starting from the early nineties? Or, are we all victims of an attempt to affirm a uni-polaristic and uni-lateralistic geopolitical system disputed between Washington and Moscow ? Why does the dynamic of "force" seem to have become the instrument of accommodation and resolution of international relations and disputes? The questions would still be many, and probably, any potential attempt at reasoning on the individual points highlighted would result in a fruitless stylistic exercise considering that, day after day, the war context would seem to undergo not only territorial changes, but also, and above all, to transformations of a political nature. A fact, in my opinion, seems to be incontrovertible: the further process of enlargement towards the east of NATO would have the sole effect of contributing to weakening the idea and the objective of the realization of a common European defense , thereby favoring, for that very reason, the pursuit of the process of marginalization of the Union aimed at relegating it, slavishly, to a position of dependent decision-making "reserve".
The signs are embarrassing to say the least. In the meantime, because, on the level of the factual and ideological reconstruction of the reasons given to justify the US intervention process in Ukraine and the related enlargement of NATO, the various sources are Atlantic, and therefore clearly oriented to "disclose" a precise version and self-referral of the issues under discussion. Therefore, because this circumstance, apparently taken for granted and commonly as uncritically "accepted", tends to favor a certain information asymmetry whereby complex phenomena "participated" and "experienced" by a plurality of international "actors" end up being studied and analyzed only through the point of view of the current "Deus ex Machina " ( the US one in particular ), according to the logic of what some like to define, and not surprisingly, as the " single dominant thought" .
Furthermore, because, if it is true, as it is true, that all the historical processes of greater importance tend to unfold over a more or less long period of time, based on multiple evaluations that cannot, or how much they could not, ignore a discussion also at a popular level on the reasons for the expediency and convenience of such a choice (that of joining NATO), then we really do not understand, why, countries that are notoriously neutral, in a totally inconsistent and sudden way not to having received real war solicitations of warning, have resolved in the sense of adhering to a strategic plan of expansion of a pro-Atlantic matrix (in this case) tending to spread the idea of a NATO as a "pillar" of a renewed one, but far from secured, European security architecture . Finally, because, although many tend to deny it, on balance, NATO does not seem to constitute a real danger at all for Vladimir Putin and for his vast Empire, since the latter, precisely in the context of the war in progress, has already shown resistance underlining the persistence of a bi-polar relationship of forces, but it would be more correct to say multi-polar, difficult to unhinge through simple military operations conducted at a distance.
In essence, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict , contrary to what the United States would seem to have believed, has helped to highlight the strategic "weight" of countries such as Turkey, China and India which, when through their intervention to encourage the creation of a table of peace, when through their programmed silences, they managed to underline the importance of their “presence / absence” as a fracturing element of the block system that existed until yesterday. All the more so when the hypothesis of a further enlargement of NATO, realistic in its practical consistency, but very little considered in terms of consequences, wants to be pursued regardless of any careful evaluation of the actors potentially involved, even on the level of mere opportunity, in the global geopolitical economy.
And even more so when we want to consider that the situation that emerged after ninety interminable days of conflict , has contributed to favoring and determining the emergence of a plurality of new "powers" differently competing and decidedly superior to the past which, combined with the contextual lack of stable relations and solid international institutions of reference, will end up making the establishing (if indeed this is the case) world order particularly uncertain and shaky. With all due respect to both the United States and Russia. The circumstance tacticism, if it can be valid in the short term, cannot become the rule within a centrifugal war vortex that imposes continuous strategic decisions that may be useful in the immediate term, but very little decisive in the medium and long term. Sovereign States, including Italy , are therefore called upon to carry out foreign policy initiatives finally marked by the realization of their own particular interest, even beyond and beyond, the wishes of the United States and / or those of any other political decision-maker of supra-national importance. : where multipolar ideological "disorder" reigns , only the creation of blocks of "regional" relevance can help to balance the system of international relations, bringing it back to rationality.
What is most worrying is, on the one hand, the total absence of Political Personalities at the height of the events and, on the other hand, the lack of a broad strategic vision useful to indicate the direction to be taken not only to favor the cessation of the conflict , but also for the reconstruction of relations between East and West .
Giuseppina Di Salvatore
(Lawyer - Nuoro)