The polls are approaching and we are back to discussing differentiated autonomy. Only a few days ago the Senate rejected the so-called "prejudices" put forward by the opposition. The Calderoli bill, if considered even only on the level of political debate, represents an ideological fracture point, and not only that, of no small importance. The approval of such a reform should have, at the very least, been preceded by a popular referendum capable of influencing and testing the will of the Italians given and considering that the definitive green light for such a project will have an important impact on the daily life of the population all.

According to what we learn, the modification amendments proposed by Fratelli d'Italia would tend to be aimed at compressing the compromising effects of the reform to be approved. But, it would seem at a first glance, although potentially aimed at obtaining an increase in resources for all those Regions that had not requested Autonomy at the time of approval of the measure containing the essential levels of performance, those same amendments, in progress, do not they would seem able to offer guarantees in this sense. At least, currently, it would seem difficult to support it. Especially when the aforementioned Calderoli bill seems to omit any and all reflections on differentiated regionalism by equating it on a differential level with the principles of statutory autonomy of the Regions in their being "special" and/or instead "ordinary". And, probably, the circumstance does not seem to be able to be overlooked at all.

The conditions of particular autonomy, recognized for the Special Statute Regions, undeniably qualify to place themselves on a level of derogation from a regime of so-called common law, since the autonomy recognized for such realities necessarily ends up embracing different areas of intervention , concerning, from time to time, both the internal organization of the Region that is affected, as well as the distribution of competences, as well as the space involving the relations between the Region itself and the State and the financial regime. This should be considered sufficient to express the utmost caution in wanting to intervene on an organizational structure that is so complex, and so difficult to manage already under the given conditions, that as a consequence of the Calderoli bill it could even suffer a setback.

In the meantime, because, even if we want to consider and/or concede everything, the "specialty" that characterizes even the Sardinia Region cannot in any way be considered such solely on a purely formal profile, since it is a reality that is certainly self-referential in some way , but still recognized as such by the Constitutional Charter itself. Therefore, because, representing the Calderoli bill, the further reform project to the Constitutional Charter, beyond those of 1999 and then 2001 respectively regarding regionalism, there would not appear to be such compelling elements to believe that the same does not can end in nothing. The referendum rejection of the Renzi-Boschi project in 2016 appears to be an important logical legal precedent on the subject, nor should it be overlooked if one really wanted to proceed with the utmost caution. Finally, because it is always and dutifully the state organizational chart that is considered the focal point for decision-making exchange at every level. Let us agree on this last point more precisely: the centralizing need should not be seen as a weakness to the equally appreciable need for modernization and decentralization (if there were to be much discussion about it), since it would not seem at all certain that the latter can have a better success than the first, always having to deal with the individual and varied territorial realities and their specificities which, in a country like Italy seems to be, are so many and such that the real goal would, if anything, be represented by achievement of management uniformity capable of guaranteeing similar levels of growth from north to south. Even more so, when the Italian reality itself, precisely, seems to constitute an important example in this sense: in the face of extremely dynamic and active territorial realities, there seem to be others which, however, are not such or are not yet so. , consequent that only a model of strong fiscal solidarity could guarantee its full and harmonious development aimed at achieving appreciable levels of government, including decentralized ones, with the passage of time.

At the current moment, the reform that is intended to be pursued does not appear to be able to be considered in terms of utility given that it would probably be inappropriate to think of being able to proceed at different levels of territorial development. The country needs to be able to benefit from compliant and uniform levels of growth if it is to be brought to important levels of competitiveness even in a supranational context. Rather, it would be necessary to proceed in the direction of the progressive reduction of particularisms by aiming for homogeneous levels of growth.

Giuseppina Di Salvatore

(Lawyer – Nuoro)

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