According to what has been learned from the news from the major news agencies, it would seem that Maria Elisabetta Alberta Casellati , following the leaked indiscretions about her ministerial reform activity, has clarified that " she will never void the prerogatives of the Head of State ".

The current contingency, the socio-economic needs, the announced difficulties of a budget law that already promises to be "prudent", would seem to contribute to making the discussion on the so-called "premiere" (improperly said) completely extemporaneous . And probably as such it can well be perceived by the majority of the associates.

But, beyond the indiscretions and the consequent clarifications, even if we want to disregard the probably inopportune timing of a constitutional reform which would be far-reaching, and which, as such, would need not only to be submitted to a popular referendum to compulse the real will of the Italians on the point (as well as their specific interest in the matter due to the "prerogatives" of a political and legal nature under discussion), and also wanting to ignore the contingent need, but also the future one, of a reform of such consistency that to date it would not seem to have been disclosed with determination, clarity and transparency, what would be its concrete relevance precisely in terms of government dynamics? What would be the compelling reason, and not otherwise extendable, which would impose the discussion in the short term, admitted and perhaps not granted that the topic interests civil society called today to address the needs of everyday life? Would it really be possible, alias compatible with our constitutional system, even before being useful (and it would be necessary to establish for whom it would actually be useful and to remedy what) a model of "premierato" even if "Italianized" in tricolor sauce? Also because, don't forget, it would be necessary (and this is said only and solely on the argumentative level since the theme has returned to the fore) to agree (and so to speak) on the correct identification of the constitutional mechanisms through which to conform and substantiate the so-called government structure. And not only that, assuming and not assuming that an operation of this kind is already easy to carry out, given that, in the hypothesis, it would be necessary to pay attention, and not only attention, to the balance of power between political parties in consideration of their new strengthened role, but also, and consequently, to the dynamics of internal selection of potential candidates who would primarily derive their legitimacy from that same choice. All without considering, and one could not even ignore it, that the mechanism for strengthening the institutions involved, i.e. governors, who would be responsible for achieving the unity and efficiency of government action, should correspond, in a subtle amount very certain counter-balance of counterweight, the simultaneous and essential strengthening of all the so-called guarantee institutions.

So: far from wanting to proceed simplistically with the modification of only articles 88, 92 and 94 of our Constitutional Charter, it would really be necessary to review the constitutional structure in its entirety precisely because of the fact that such a reform, of which there would seem to be no need, would willingly or unwillingly impose a radical change of the "point of view", that is, of the way of conceiving the political structures and the very different governance mechanisms. So let's understand each other then: with the British model, the Italian parliamentary system has absolutely nothing to do, nor can the former be portrayed, for example, for the construction of a similar Italian model which, precisely because it is such, would only be the palest and most imperfect dysmorphic representation of a "system" as fragile in its consistency as fallacious in its action and operation.

The binomial between "premiership" and "parliamentary system", anything but easy to interpret and solve, is not an automatic implementation mechanism, and it would be a serious procedural error to treat it as such, since, as it probably seems correct to be, in any State with a constitutional and democratic basis, the government institutions would seem to be called, in their function, to correspond to a dual need coming from an electoral body which, considering the absenteeism rates recorded in the last electoral rounds, appears tired and demotivated.

In other words, it is a matter of both the need to know how to be efficiently represented in its request for good governance conducted in the name of the people and for the people, having very clear needs and providing for them, and that, no less relevant, of being able to express own participatory thinking in the context of decisions through the choice of one's rulers. But there would not seem to be a concrete need for change also because, to put it bluntly, with the current system, where there is and persists trust on the part of Parliament, it is possible to guarantee stability by providing, in the pathological hypothesis, and as happened in the recent years, a different government with a different premier even in the absence of elections. If this weren't an advantage of parliamentary democracies, it would really be difficult to understand what else we were talking about. A possible constitutional reform providing for a sort of "premiership" (improperly said) could only, considering everything, strengthen governmental instability with all consequences in terms of the feasibility of reforms and government action.

Who could possibly benefit? Probably no one, not even those who would like to introduce it. The "premiered" formula, perhaps captivating in terms of political propaganda due to its sure media impact, but equally empty of meaning, at least in the current state it would appear to be such, would seem to appear irreproducible in its technical terms (not even analytically identified as far as is known) in the legalized Italian constitutional landscape in detail.

In short, the time does not seem certain to discuss such a reform, and even in the near future, the same government, if it continues to hold office, could probably find itself in the need to abandon the project. In the meantime, it seems appropriate to remain anchored in the present to resolve the stringent economic issues associated with everyday life.

Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro

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