In recent times, given current events and global upheavals, the key concepts on the domestic political level, especially given the approaching next election, seem to be two: "primaries" and "electoral law." The former are simply electoral procedures used to allow the electorate (i.e., the base) to effectively select from within a party/coalition the candidate or candidates nominated for public office, who, in doing so, would not be designated or imposed beforehand by the parties. The latter, on the other hand, is understood as a set of legal norms governing the voting process itself, which translates the votes cast by the general membership into parliamentary or administrative seats.

It goes without saying that the two concepts intersect, impacting each other more or less directly. In this sense, what has now been dubbed the "Stabilicum" has caused considerable discussion. Or, more simply, a proposed electoral law, presented at the end of February 2026 and strongly supported by the Meloni government, can be described as a proportional system with a majority bonus specifically designed to ensure stability, at least according to its promoters, assuming, perhaps not conceding, that a government's stability can rest on numbers alone. Translated into a nutshell, and to better understand what we're talking about, 70 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 35 in the Senate for those who surpass 40% of the vote, with blocked lists and a strong focus on nominating a leader, and a 3% threshold.

The reform, moreover, would almost entirely eliminate single-member constituencies and would seem to assume that a coalition would win more than 40 percent of the vote. What if that weren't the case? In short, it would be a bill in line with the idea/reform of the so-called Premiership and with the idea of thus bypassing the negative effects of abstentionism.

No question, one might exclaim. If only electoral systems, whatever their formula, didn't end up conditioning the form of government, that is, the relationships established between the constitutional bodies (electoral body, legislative branch, and executive branch), in terms of political direction. This is because the electoral system adopted changes the political and institutional structure of the form of government, as the Prime Ministerial Bill demonstrates. And again, no question, if only by doing so, one wouldn't end up impacting and conditioning the role of the parties considered individually and within the coalition to which they belong, generating forms of multiparty politics that are difficult to manage and, therefore, constant fragmentation. This is completely counter to the intention of their architects. Reflecting on the current Italian political and party situation, we might roughly observe that center-left political forces and the Five Star Movement would tend to favor a proportional system, while center-right forces, with due distinctions, would generally favor a majoritarian system. Generally speaking, if the electoral reform were to pass, and if it were to significantly compromise representativeness for the sole purpose of ensuring government stability, it would likely pose unconstitutional aspects that would render the reform unworkable. This is especially true if, at a rational level, some might also observe that a proportional system, such as the one proposed, with a very strong majority bonus, could translate into a sort of fully-fledged majoritarian electoral system. This latter circumstance, regardless of the tradition followed by certain parties, would make primaries necessary for everyone: center-left and center-right. With the possibility that current coalition alliances may no longer be such.

Giuseppina Di Salvatore – Lawyer, Nuoro

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