An appeal against the Presidency of the Council of Ministers challenging the constitutionality of the new electoral law was filed this morning with the Cagliari Court.

The appeal, signed by lawyers Giovanni Dore, Carlo Augusto Melis, and Alessandro Tedde, has garnered broad support among Sardinian civil society, involving leading figures from the academic, legal, institutional, political, and cultural worlds.

The appellants include constitutional lawyers Pietro Ciarlo, Gianmario Demuro, and Andrea Deffenu; former regional president Federico Palomba; Gian Mario Selis (former president of the Regional Council); Maria Del Zompo, former rector of the University of Cagliari; and academics and jurists Francesco Sitzia, Andrea Pubusa, and Carlo Dore Jr. Numerous representatives of civil society also joined the petition.

The initiative launched in Cagliari is part of a broader national effort , coordinated with the network of lawyers led by Roberto Zaccaria, Pietro Adami, Federico Grosso, and Maria Agostina Cabiddu. The network will file similar appeals before the courts of the other 25 Italian Courts of Appeal, sparking a nationwide initiative aimed at submitting questions of the legitimacy of the new electoral law to the Constitutional Court.

The legal action stems from the belief that the new electoral rules "serious conflict with the fundamental principles of the Constitution, particularly with respect to equality of the vote, the freedom of voters to choose their representatives, political pluralism, and the balance of the parliamentary form of government," the proponents explain.

There are eight specific reasons for the appeal.   Regarding the majority bonus, the law awards a bonus of 70 deputies and 35 senators to the coalition that reaches the required threshold of 42% of the vote. According to the plaintiffs, this mechanism risks creating an excessive disproportion between electoral consensus and parliamentary seats, sacrificing the principle of equality of the vote. The seats from the majority bonus are awarded to candidates pre-selected by the parties, without the possibility for voters to express preferences. This reduces the number of parliamentarians elected through the ordinary preference system, curtailing citizens' right to choose their representatives.

National seat distribution and territorial representation. "The seat allocation system can determine results in individual constituencies influenced by votes cast in other parts of the country, weakening the direct relationship between voters, the territory, and elected officials."

On the national Senate bonus and the connection between the chambers. The national majority bonus for the Senate raises doubts regarding Article 57 of the Constitution, which provides for its election on a regional basis. The mechanism that makes the award of the bonus dependent on the results of both chambers, thus impacting their constitutional autonomy, is also being challenged. Blocked front-runners and multiple candidacies. " The priority given to front-runners and the possibility of running in multiple constituencies concentrates the power to determine who is elected in the hands of the parties, making the voters' choice less transparent and effective."

Gender balance. The elimination of the 60% limit for each gender in top-of-the-list positions "risks weakening guarantees of effective female representation." The proportionality of the new gender constraints on the expression of preferences is also questioned.

Mandatory nomination of a candidate for Prime Minister . The requirement for all lists to pre-select a candidate for Prime Minister, under penalty of exclusion from the elections, "limits freedom of political participation and risks surreptitiously introducing elements of direct investiture of the Prime Minister, altering the balance of the parliamentary form of government envisaged by Articles 92 and 94 of the Constitution."

Increased signature requirements for submitting lists. Increasing the required signatures from the previous 1,500-2,000 to 6,000-7,000 per constituency, given the benefits granted to political parties already represented, "risks severely hindering the participation of new political entities, in conflict with the principles of pluralism and equal opportunity in electoral competition. This is an issue that is particularly acute for smaller political groups, which are required to shoulder far greater organizational and financial burdens than parties already represented in Parliament, with the risk of compromising effective equal access to the electoral process."

(Unioneonline)

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